After years of study by constitutional scholars, reform organizations, and the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States, Congress now has before it a concrete bill to reform Supreme Court tenure without packing the Court and without amending the Constitution.
The bill is H.R. 3544, the Supreme Court Tenure Establishment and Retirement Modernization Act of 2025, introduced in the 119th Congress by Rep. Hank Johnson of Georgia. It deserves far more attention than it has received because it does not merely express dissatisfaction with the Court. It offers a workable statutory framework: staggered 18-year terms of regular active service, a predictable appointment schedule, and a transition of Justices into senior status rather than a removal from constitutional office.
That distinction is the heart of the reform. The proposal does not abolish life tenure. It modernizes the duties attached to the office of Supreme Court Justice.
Declining Confidence in the Supreme Court
Ethics controversies, sweeping rulings, and increasingly partisan confirmation fights have significantly eroded trust in the country’s highest court. Unless confidence is restored soon, the result may be a deeper loss of confidence in the entire judicial system by ordinary Americans.
The crisis is not hypothetical. Public confidence in the Court has fallen to levels that should alarm anyone who cares about the rule of law. Recent polling shows that the public is divided almost evenly over whether it views the Court favorably, while partisan divisions over the Court have become severe. Americans may disagree about particular decisions, but the Court cannot function over the long term if large segments of the public view it as a political prize rather than as an independent constitutional tribunal.
Term limits are not a liberal or conservative attack on the Court. Properly designed, they are an institutional reform. They would reduce the political lottery created by random vacancies, lessen the incentive for Justices to time their retirements for partisan advantage, and lower the stakes of each confirmation battle.
What H.R. 3544 Would Do
H.R. 3544 is the current version of the Supreme Court Tenure Establishment and Retirement Modernization Act. It would amend Title 28 of the United States Code to create a regular appointment process. The President would nominate one Supreme Court Justice in the first and third years after a presidential election. In practical terms, every four-year presidential term would carry two Supreme Court appointments.
The bill would also provide that an individual, once confirmed by the Senate, may serve only one 18-year term as a Supreme Court Justice in regular active service. After 18 years, the Justice would be deemed retired from regular active service under the existing federal judicial retirement framework.
Just as important, H.R. 3544 addresses Senate obstruction. It requires the Senate to exercise its advice-and-consent authority within 90 days after a nomination. If the President withdraws a nomination or the Senate rejects it, the President must submit another nomination, and the Senate must act within 120 days.
The bill also contains a transition provision for the current Court. Sitting Justices would move from regular active service in order of length of service as new Justices are commissioned. The longest-serving Justice would be the first to transition as the new system takes effect.
Finally, H.R. 3544 would create a senior-justice mechanism. If the Court falls below the number of Justices provided by law because of a vacancy, disability, or disqualification, a Justice who has retired from regular active service but retained the office would be selected through a publicly transparent and randomized process to serve temporarily until the Court returns to full strength.
This is not court-packing. The bill does not add seats. It regularizes appointments and restores the Court to a rhythm more consistent with democratic accountability and judicial independence.
A Related Bill Shows the Reform Is No Longer Theoretical
H.R. 3544 is not the only Supreme Court term-limits proposal pending in the current Congress. H.R. 1074, the Supreme Court Term Limits and Regular Appointments Act of 2025, introduced by Rep. Ro Khanna and Rep. Don Beyer, would also establish regular appointments and 18-year active-service limits. That bill, however, exempts sitting Justices and applies prospectively to Justices approved after enactment.
The difference is important. H.R. 1074 is more gradual. H.R. 3544 is more immediate. Both bills recognize the same core problem: lifetime active service on the Supreme Court has become inconsistent with the needs of a modern constitutional democracy.
Growing Tenure of Supreme Court Justices
The Constitution allows federal judges to hold office during good behavior. In modern practice, that has meant that Supreme Court Justices serve until they choose to retire, die, or are removed through impeachment. The result is that vacancies arise unpredictably and sometimes at moments of extraordinary political advantage.
The current system did not operate in the same way for most of American history. Earlier Justices generally served shorter terms. Modern Justices, by contrast, can serve for several decades. As a result, a single appointment can influence constitutional law for a generation or more.
This is why the timing of retirements has become so politically charged. A Justice’s personal decision to retire, or not retire, can shape the Court for decades. Presidents and Senate majorities now treat vacancies as once-in-a-generation prizes. Confirmation hearings have become national political combat because the prize is so large and the timing so arbitrary.
Staggered 18-year terms would change that. Each president would receive two appointments per term. Each seat would turn over on a predictable schedule. Confirmation hearings would still matter, but they would no longer carry the same apocalyptic stakes.
Chief Justice Roberts Saw the Problem
Long before he became Chief Justice, John Roberts recognized the problem created by decades-long judicial tenure. He observed that life tenure was adopted at a time when people did not live as long as they do now, and that judges insulated from ordinary life for 25 or 30 years were once rare but had become increasingly common.
Roberts suggested that a fixed term, such as 15 years, would provide more regular turnover and help ensure that federal judges do not lose touch with the world outside the judiciary. That observation is even more persuasive today. The Supreme Court now decides questions involving technology, executive power, elections, administrative agencies, reproductive rights, criminal justice, environmental regulation, and individual liberties in a world that changes rapidly. No Justice should exercise that level of power over national life for 30 or 40 years.
Constitutionality of Supreme Court Term Limits
Opponents of term limits often argue that Article III requires life tenure for Supreme Court Justices. That objection is not as strong as it sounds.
Article III provides that federal judges hold their offices during good behavior. It does not expressly say that a Justice must exercise the full active judicial power of the Supreme Court for life. The Good Behavior Clause was designed to protect judicial independence by preventing Congress or the President from removing judges for political reasons. It was not designed to give each Justice a lifetime monopoly over one of nine active seats on the Supreme Court.
H.R. 3544 is structured around that distinction. A Justice who completes 18 years of regular active service would not be stripped of office. The Justice would retain the office and transition into senior status, with judicial duties available under a statutory framework. In other words, the bill changes duties; it does not remove the Justice.
Congress has long exercised substantial authority over the structure and administration of the federal judiciary. The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the lower federal courts and set the original structure of the Supreme Court. Since then, Congress has altered the number of Supreme Court seats, adjusted federal jurisdiction, created new federal judgeships, and established senior status for Article III judges.
If Congress can define the structure of the federal judiciary, and if senior status is compatible with Article III for lower federal judges and retired Justices, Congress should also be able to define a system in which Supreme Court Justices serve 18 years in regular active service and then retain their office with different duties.